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SAMUEL BECKETT, CLAUDE SIMON AND THE MISE
EN ABYME OF PARADOXICAL DUPLICATION
Anthony Macris
In his seminal study of novelistic mise en abyme structures, The Mir-
ror in the Text, Lucien Dällenbach identifies a type he calls the mise
en abyme of paradoxical duplication. Characterised by an extreme
self-reflexivity, Dällenbach explores the operations of this literary
trope in the later novels of the nouveau roman, particularly those of
Claude Simon and Samuel Beckett. This article explores how Simon
and Beckett employ this device with radically different results,
Simon’s forming part of a textual poetics that engages with the mate-
rial and social, while Beckett’s tends to a privileging of the self-
reflexivity of language.
While many thematic commonalities exist between the works of
Claude Simon and Samuel Beckett, in particular their preoccupation
with existential themes such as the suffering of humanity and the
struggle to maintain an ethics in a chaotic, fragmented world, there are
also significant formal points of comparison, not least the of which is
their innovative use of the mise en abyme.
In this essay, I will use as my methodological framework the
most comprehensive study of the mise en abyme to date, Lucien Däl-
lenbach’s The Mirror in the Text (1989), in order to examine some of
ways Beckett and Simon use this literary device in their novels. In
particular I wish to argue that there are significant differences in how
they employ the mise en abyme as a compositional device, differences
that have a profound impact upon the thematic implications of their
respective oeuvres, with the Simonian mise en abyme forming part of
a textual poetics that has a tendency to engage more with the material
and social, while Beckett’s leans towards a privileging of the self-
reflexivity of consciousness and language. Despite these differences,
however, I also wish to suggest that the strategies used by Beckett and
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Simon lead the mise en abme to its very limits as an ordering princi-
ple, and bring it to the threshold of its own dissolution. Their work
also points to certain limitations of Dällenbach’s paradigm, particu-
larly its reliance on a structuralist methodology that tends to omit im-
portant aspects of the mise en abyme’s expressive capabilities.
For Dällenbach it is the new nouveau roman1 that is particularly
rich in what he terms the type III mise en abyme, or the mise en abyme
of paradoxical duplication, in which “the degree of the analogy be-
tween the mise en abyme and the object it reflects” (1989, 110) grows
ever closer. For such a mise en abyme structure to function, there must
be a kind of isomorphism between the reflected and reflecting ele-
ments of the text. Thus the Type III mise en abyme is characterised by
texts that are mimetic of themselves not in part, but as a whole. Their
mode of reflection is no longer that of resemblance (Type I), or enun-
ciative self-reference (Type II), but complete identification with them-
selves. De Nooy pithily sums up Type III as seeming “to contain the
work that actually contains it” (1991, 19). But how can a literary text
be truly imitative of itself? If it were an exact copy of itself, wouldn’t
the entire function of duplication, of copying and mirroring, become
redundant, because, replicated in its entirety, the work would have
dispensed with the very moment of reflection? It is for this reason that
Type III has been given the name of paradoxical duplication, because
it is precisely this total identification with itself that it tries to achieve.
It is typical of Samuel Beckett2 that he would successfully cap-
ture such a paradoxical structure with the simplest of materials: a pen-
cil. In Malone Dies, the unnamed narrator, confined to bed in a small
room, writes himself into existence in a small exercise-book. It is not
immediately obvious to the reader, however, that this is what is hap-
pening.
I fear I must have fallen asleep again. In vain I grope, I can-
not find my exercise-book. But I still have the pencil in my
hand. I shall have to wait for day to break. God knows what
I am going to do till then.
I have just written, I fear I must have fallen, etc. I
hope this is not too great a distortion of the truth. I now add
these few lines, before departing from myself again.
(Beckett 1976, 209)
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As in Cervantes and Gide, it is once again on the level of enunciation
that the reflection takes place. But unlike them, Beckett has extended
the duplication to the very act of writing itself. Throughout Malone
Dies Beckett makes great use of this pencil, turning it into a grue-
somely comic prop whose various aspects throw light onto the mode
of reflection itself.
My pencil. It is a little Venus, still green no doubt, with five
or six facets, pointed at both ends and so short there is just
room, between them, for my thumb and the two adjacent
fingers, gathered together in a little vice. I use the two points
turn and turn about, sucking them frequently, I love to suck.
And when they go quite blunt I strip them with my nails
which are long, yellow, sharp and brittle for want of chalk or
is it phosphate. So little by little my little pencil dwindles,
inevitably, and the day is fast approaching when nothing
will remain but a fragment too tiny to hold. So I write as
lightly as I can.
(223)
The writing act takes place under the most tenuous of conditions, with
a pencil so short that not much can be written, by a man who is dying.
What suspense there is in the narrative comes from seeing which will
give out first: the lead or the narrator. The alternation of the two pen-
cil points, punctuated by the sucking of the narrator, combine to make
a mocking portrait of the artist hero; there is no polo-necked Sartre
here leading radical students into riots, only a dying consciousness
that writes itself into, and finally, out of existence. Beckett’s pencil
also evokes the Ouroboros motif, this image of the serpent biting its
own tail one of Dällenbach’s favourite symbols of Type III. Although
the end result may be the same, with the text devouring itself, Beck-
ett’s motif is at the same time both more elegant and frightening: the
very pressure of the writer’s hand, the very words he writes, ensuring
the text’s conclusion, and the writer’s very own fingernails agonis-
ingly tear at the wood in order to sharpen the pencil that records his
own end.
Compositionally, however, the overall structure of Malone Dies
is less sophisticated than the enunciative procedures contained in it.
The narration of the act of writing takes the textual form of episodes
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interspersed between the stories invented by the narrator to amuse
himself, the darkly funny tales of the Saposcats, the Lamberts, and
Macmann. Thus, in Malone Dies, the writing does indeed produce
itself, the characteristic most important to Dällenbach’s Type III. The
text has reached a level of self-identity not seen in its earlier forms,
and it is this kind of extreme linguistic self-referentiality that Dällen-
bach’s terms the transcendental mise en abyme, a subcategory of Type
III (1989, 101). But even if the mise en abyme is here self-generating,
it also, in Beckett’s example, guarantees its own abolition, an aspect
crucial to the theme of Malone Dies. As in Melville and Simon, the
device is not used gratuitously, or merely for the love of its trompe
l’oeil effects (as it is in much of the nouveau roman, for example
Robbe-Grillet). Rather it embodies a theme that could not have been
achieved in any other way: the manner in which self-creation and self-
abolition form the twin face of the Janus mask.
By the time Beckett comes to write Company,3 the gap between
the sophistication of the enunciation procedures and the stories and
characters represented by it is significantly narrowed, and a text of
great complexity is produced. Company presents the reader with an
inversion of the relation between form and content as manifest in
Malone Dies. The consciousness of the narrator shatters as it is put
through a process of multivocalisation, but one where the enunciative
flows are subject to paradoxical duplication. Previous efforts in the
history of literary theory to explicate the relations between who
speaks and sees – “point of view” in the Anglo-American parlance,
and “focalisation”, in the French – can barely accommodate the self-
reflexive processes that traverse the consciousness of Beckett’s char-
acter lying in the dark. These flows of voices, memories and persons
(second, third, and later mentioned, but only mentioned, first), config-
ure and reconfigure, their discreteness an illusion as the narrative pro-
gresses and we find that each is dependent on the other in a such way
that no single hierarchy can be established:
A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine.
To one on his back in the dark. This he can tell by the pres-
sure on his hind parts and by how the dark changes when he
shuts his eyes and again when he opens them again. Only a
small part of what is said can be verified. As for example
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when he hears, You are on your back in the dark. Then he
must acknowledge the truth of what is said. But by far the
greater part of what is said cannot be verified. As for exam-
ple when he hears, You first saw the light on such and such a
day and now you are on your back in the dark. Sometimes
the two are combined as for example, You first saw the light
on such and such a day and now you are on your back in the
dark. A device perhaps from the incontrovertibility of one to
win credence for the other. That then is the proposition. To
one on his back in the dark a voice tells of a past. With occa-
sional allusion to a present and more rarely to a future for
example, You will end as you now are. And in another dark
or in the same another devising it all for company. Quick
leave him.
Use of the second person marks the voice. That of the third
that cankerous other. Could he speak to and of whom the
voice speaks there would be a first. But he cannot. He shall
not. You cannot. You shall not.
(1989, 5-6)
The voice that designates the “you”, the person lying in the dark, and
that speaks his memories, will start to tell stories in a way reminiscent
of Malone Dies. There are, however, significant differences. No
longer are the “stories” explicitly stated as being self-conscious re-
flections, the product of a unitary consciousness. Via the use of per-
son, predominantly second and third, Beckett subdivides conscious-
ness into linguistic flows that are suspended in a voice that cannot be
directly identified.
But little by little attempts at identification are made, ration-
alisations that endeavor to establish the relations between the branches
of this manifold subject diffused among the faint glimmerings that
emerge between darkness and memory. Soon the voice claims to be its
own “deviser”, its own self-creating instance.
Deviser of the voice and of its hearer and of himself. Deviser
of himself for company. Leave it at that. He speaks of him-
self as of another. He says speaking of himself, He speaks of
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himself as another. Himself he too devised for company.
Leave it at that.
(20)
Here we can clearly identify a kind of radical reflexivity of enuncia-
tion, a nearly pure Cartesian moment that empties consciousness of all
its contents in order to build up the external world from nothing, from
the void. Only, in this case, the foundational moments short-circuits.
The primary flow of enunciation refuses to act as a substratum for
communication, instead collapsing life and memory into itself, into a
whirlpool of flows and persons that can’t be stabilised. Again and
again Beckett tries to find, if not a central point of reference, then at
least some clear patterns of relationships. But he fails. The narrative
voice hovers at the limits of naming itself, defining itself, categorising
itself, but refutes these attempts in a moment of aporia, returning to
one of Beckett’s central themes, the unnamable.
For why not? Why in another dark or in the same? And
whose voice is asking this? Who asks, Whose voice asking
this? And answers, His soever who devises it all. In the same
dark as his creature or in another. For company. Who asks in
the end, Who asks? And in the end answers as above? And
adds long after to himself, Unless another still. Nowhere to
be found. Nowhere to be sought. The unthinkable last of all.
Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick leave him.
(19)
Emerging out of this field of instabilities is a dialectic that runs
throughout Beckett’s work, the unnamable/I dialectic, a nodal point on
which the maze of relations of consciousness converges, but only
temporarily, only conditionally. For at the heart of this maze is an “I”
suspended in a void, a void suspended in an I. Here we also see, in
this second Beckett trilogy, a definitive inversion of the use of the I.
In Beckett’s early trilogy the I is foregrounded, it acts as a Cartesian
consciousness in which all else is suspended, even if Beckett’s end
goal is to decompose this hierarchy. In the second trilogy the I is
nearly completely effaced: in Company in particular it is utterly sub-
ordinated to the second and third persons. Such a progression has
important implications for the mise en abyme of paradoxical duplica-
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tion: it points to a series of inversions and mirrorings that are not only
internal to specific works, but to Beckett’s work as an oeuvre. The I
that stands at the forefront, and in which all other voices are sus-
pended in the earlier trilogy (the stories made up to keep the narrator
amused), now takes an inverted position, is relegated to an indeter-
minable coordinate, has narratively become the unnamable, and, in a
perfect mirroring, gazes through the layers of memories, stories and
persons back at the Cartesian I of the earlier trilogy.
By the end of Company, the unnamable will have spoken itself
to its final state, that of absolute solitude: “alone” is the last word in
Beckett’s text. Thus the conclusion, provisional as always, and typical
of Beckett, is to leave the narrative agency utterly separate from other
consciousness. Yet it is inside this “alone” that the manifold voices
swarm, multiply, factor themselves out of themselves. Inside this
“alone” a kind of pure self-reflexive movement of consciousness is
enacted, a paradoxical mise en abyme of voices that create themselves,
abolish themselves, and recreate themselves all over again in a Sisy-
phean movement that embodies, in a near pre-linguistic domain,
Beckett’s attempt to render the process of the production of meaning.4
Simon’s Triptyque is also an example of a type III mise en
abyme, but one that employs different techniques to create its effects
of implosion of frame and miniature. In Triptyque Simon once again
refuses to employ simple enunciation procedures in order to further
develop his use of the mise en abyme. Instead, he embarks upon an
experiment that, even as it builds on his love of metaphor and anal-
ogy, involves taking two steps back in order to take one forward. In
his works of the 1970s, Simon tends to abandon the long lyrical sen-
tences that typified his earlier style, heavily influenced by Proust and
Faulkner, and which attempted, through often overly complex sen-
tences structures full of subordinate clauses and parentheses inside
parentheses, to exploit the metaphorical power of language and image
at every possible moment. With Les Corps Conducteurs his style be-
comes increasingly disciplined, with the metaphorical level displaced
to one where images breed out of one another in striking ways. In
Triptyque his style becomes simpler again, with an accompanying
increase of complexity in the novel’s compositional schema.
Replacing Les Corps Conducteurs’ single story line and single
level of action is a series of three tableaux that are arranged sequen-
tially. Triptyque’s first part is set in a village, the second in the coun-
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tryside, the third in an urban zone. Each of these chapters constitutes a
separate mirror, each reflecting the other in such a way that there is
now no longer any hierarchy between framing narrative and subordi-
nated miniature, between the subject and object of reflection. By mul-
tiplying the actual number of mises en abyme, and making each of the
same importance, Simon has begun to solve the problem of an origi-
nary text that is mirrored at all: the first term has been abolished, and
there is now only an infinite series of reflections amongst multiple
mirrors, all of which “produce” one another. In Triptyque frame and
miniature have finally imploded, the macro level now truly only the
pretext for the general organisation of the novel. These larger chapters
have been eaten away from the inside by the micro-movements of
mirrorings, embeddings, duplications and metaphorical breedings that
are no longer anchored to a ground of originary meaning, but have
been allowed to break free. Thus, somewhat differently to Beckett’s
Malone Dies (whose self-generating aspect reflects the writing act
itself), Simon demonstrates how a text can be self-producing on the
image level: it is thus given the name of the productive mise en abyme
(Dällenbach 1989, 162).
Simon achieves this productive mise en abyme by choosing
elements that lend themselves to extreme mirroring effects. Of course
his work has always featured such elements, such metaphors of origin
(Dällenbach 1989, 181-3): paintings, statues, ornate façades and mo-
tifs of all kinds dominate even his earliest novels. But in his middle
and later periods he abandons some of the more traditional metaphors
of origin associated with mise en abyme novels, and explores the layer
of reality we can term second nature, the dense field of images and
communication events thrown up by media culture in the postwar
period. Both Les Corps Conducteurs and Triptyque were written in a
period (the late 1960s and early 1970s) when media culture was rap-
idly expanding, and are full of advertising imagery such as billboards,
posters, newspapers and magazine spreads, as well as cinema images
and urban landscapes full of designed, blueprinted, networked objects
and image systems. It is as much his exploitation of this kind of im-
agery – the layer of what Jean Baudrillard termed simulacra (1983,
10-11) – as the compositional dimension of the text, that makes Trip-
tyque the unique novelistic mise en abyme it is. Simon, however, is
careful not to let these images float free in Baudrillard’s space of the
hyperreal (1983, 23). In Triptyque, as in L’Herbe and Les Corps Con-
125
ducteurs, he goes to great lengths to show how human perception is
inextricably linked to what it perceives, and how there is a recursion
between the world of consciousness and the world of things. It is the
exploration of this margin, this threshold between perception and
things, in which Simon’s work is largely situated.
But if Dällenbach has recouped the mise en abyme for textual
self-reflexivity and shown us, exhaustively, that Simon has passed the
poststructuralist test of knowing that his representation of reality is
refracted through the medium he uses, then perhaps it is time to focus
on the insights about the material world that are presented in his work.
One such sequence from Les Corps Conducteurs provides a good
example. The extract below is taken from a section where the main
character is looking down from an airplane as it flies low over a busy
city, preparing to land.
Peering down into the darkness from the airplane, the eye
can discern puzzling patches of light scattered here and there
over the surface of the dark earth below. As these patches
come closer, one can make out branching points of stars,
tentacles, incandescent crosses, like cracks in the dark crust
of earth through which trickles of lava appear to be pouring,
expelled by some cataclysm far below the surface. Flaring
up like little forest fires, looking ridiculously tiny in the im-
mense dark expanses of the night beneath the cold, slowly
wheeling constellations, the artificial flames, in which the
names of movie stars, petroleum products, perfumes, whis-
keys, and tires blaze up, go out, and flame up once again,
drift slowly past, fighting an insane battle against the shad-
ows attempting to engulf them. Rent for the space of an in-
stant, driven back for a moment by the blindingly bright
force of millions of volts, these shadows then close in again,
inexorably advancing and receding with each of the pulsa-
tions produced by huge invisible machines whose motive
force has been provided by gold mines, by virgin forests
swallowed up in darkness, by blacks lashed with whips, and




Just as Beckett metonymically reduces writing to the simple tracing of
a pencil across the page of an exercise book (invoking the complexi-
ties of signification), Simon suggests an entire system of material
processes in the space of a pulse of light. In a single image Simon
unites the near and the distant, the banal and the cosmic, the sensu-
ousness of things and the abstractions that allow us to perceive them.
In this single blink of light, we see a series of inversions of the Sym-
bolist abyme: the shadows that threaten to engulf the cityscape are the
void, the gouffre, but one formed by interstices created by material
processes, in this instance the enormous organic and human forces
harnessed by the creation of electricity. The stars in the sky, studded
in constellations against the blackness of the night, become the names
of film stars that blink on and off in the neon tubing of street signs.
The analogical level here is also exploited, not only linguistically or
compositionally, but also in the series of natural forces: the flowing
lava of the volcano, the invisible machines that drive the power-
station turbine, the forests burnt up to fuel them, the exploited workers
who provide the labour in the first place. Such a series also describes a
kind of backchaining, one that demystifies capitalist operations, and
that takes us beneath the reified surfaces of the industrialised world
and into the labyrinth of forces that creates it.5
It is precisely Simon’s interest in material processes and the
implications it has for the development of the mise en abyme that
Dällenbach seems so reluctant to engage with. For Dällenbach, what is
important about pioneering novels like Triptyque is the way they
“break away from the realm of ontology and truth [...] and promote
the age of reflexion and language that Mallarmé and Roussel had her-
alded” (1989, 163).
Such conclusions are inevitable given Dällenbach’s structuralist
(and to a small degree poststructuralist) methodology. Two critical
observations are important here. Firstly, any conception of a literary
work whereby it becomes totally reflexive of itself will also entail an
extreme self-reflexivity of language. The outcomes of such an analysis
lead naturally to the Symbolist, Mallarméan tradition of self-
reflexivity, which reaches its culmination in the famous “Sonnet en
X”, a poem that tries to be reflexive of language itself (Mallarmé
1994, 217-8). The second tendency of Dällenbach’s analysis is that
the sign will dominate over the referent, and literary works that are
rooted in the reference function of language, that try to exploit the
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mise en abyme in order to render, by analogy, patterns in the material
world, will be near impossible to theorise. Analysis of Simon’s work
becomes extremely partial if it is interpreted only from the point of
view of this more transcendental, Symbolist conception of the mise en
abyme.
It is not for nothing that Simon has used the chosisme of the
nouveau roman to depict these phenomena: through the narration of
things,6 the exploitation of both the metaphorical power of language
and material processes, he develops the device in a way that any no-
tion of language as productive of itself cannot. This development of
the generative mise en abyme, this proliferation of mirrors and the
concrete potentialities embodied in them, and which, in a double
movement, also transform the mirrors themselves, is in many ways the
exact opposite of a Beckettian paradoxical mise en abyme, whose
concerns, at least as evidenced in novels of the first trilogy (Molly,
Malone Dies, The Unnamable), How it Is, and Company, are more
linguistic, textual and existential than directly occasioned in the social,
historical and material.
Yet even if Simon shows us that the relationship between words
and things, between signs and referents, is a complex one, it is Beckett
who explores similar complexities in the relationship between lan-
guage and consciousness. Simon’s emphasis on material processes can
make it difficult for the mise en abyme to explore the complex nature
of subjectivity, the nuances of consciousness, and how consciousness
relates to its own perceptual machinery as well as the world of other
consciousnesses. In Simon’s work, matters of focalisation and the
positioning of the subject (both intra- and extratextual) often rely on
either the kind of stream-of-consciousness techniques of high mod-
ernism, or the demetaphorised chosisme pioneered by Robbe-Grillet.
In comparison to much of Beckett’s prose from How It Is onwards,
such schemas represent relatively fixed perceptual modes, which, even
if they form a kind of surface across which the mind and the nervous
system can trace their chaotic paths, do not achieve the polyvocal
intensity of a work like Company, or, to take an example from Beck-
ett’s later work for the theatre, That Time.
Thus we can also see how Dällenbach’s model of the mise en
abyme of paradoxical duplication also runs up against certain limits in
respect to Beckett. By emphasising the non-referential aspect of lan-
guage in the Symbolist tradition, that is by emphasising the relation-
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ship between words and other words, it becomes difficult to explore
the rich permutations of Beckett’s use in Company of self-reflexive
structures in terms of polyvocal enunciation strategies and the work-
ings of human consciousness. It is this attempt to grasp the operations
of consciousness and its relations to sense and memory that wreaks
such havoc on the unitary meaning of words, not simply the attempt to
problematise any direct relations between words and things.
The attempt to categorise a form as manifold and complex as
the hyper self-reflexive mise en abyme could perhaps only have cre-
ated a situation where its textual embodiments – works such as Com-
pany and Triptyque – lead to its undoing. If this is the case, it puts the
theorisation of the Type III mise en abyme in a thankless position: the
very portal of discovery it created is closed behind it once we have
been given an entry to the works only that structure could provide.
Yet, in my view, there is a sense in which the mise en abyme of para-
doxical duplication lays the groundwork for it’s own abolition, be-
cause once the hierarchical relationship between frame and miniature,
either between mirror text and whole, between the I and its subordi-
nated voices and events, completely implode, we are left with an
open-ended textual entity that resembles a fragment of a pattern in
which no motif can dominate. It is to this very threshold that Beckett
and Simon take the development of the mise en abyme of paradoxical
duplication.
Notes
1. A new phase of the nouveau roman that Dällenbach claims begins
in the 1970s. See Dällenbach, 1989, Chapter 10.
2. Dällenbach illustrates this point with the circle image from Beck-
ett’s Watt (Dällenbach: 102-3).
3. The version of Company referred to was published with two other
prose works from the 1980s, Ill Seen Ill Said and Worstward Ho,
under the title Nohow On (1989), and is often called the second
trilogy.
4. This, of course, in no way concludes a discussion of Beckett’s use
of the mise an abyme. Krapp’s Last Tape, with its ingenious use of
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recording technology and its implications for identity and mem-
ory, is a particularly rich use of the device, but would require an
analysis of the semiotics of performance that a study of the novel
cannot comprehensively include.
5. In his notes for a film of Marx’s Capital, Sergei Eisenstein (1987)
intended to use a cinematic form, employed by Vertov in his Man
with a Movie Camera, know as the “hysteron proteron,” which
“depicts the process of production in reverse” (129).
6. See Goldmann (1975), particularly the chapter “The Nouveau
Roman and Reality”, for an account of how the narration of things
lends itself to depicting new layers of reality out of the reach of
traditional realist discourse.
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